

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PREPARING AND USING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FOR FUTURE WARS

by

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ABSTRACT

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The strategic importance of the Army National Guard (ARNG) has not been greater since World War II. The United States (U.S.) cannot meet its current military requirements without it. Increased ARNG operations tempo emphasizes this point. The Army National Guard is 42% of the Army's deployable strength. ARNG readiness and effective utilization are required to achieve national security objectives, illustrating the strategic significance of the ARNG. This paper provides understanding and prescribed steps that will insure an available, ready and effective ARNG.

U.S. military leadership requires a strong understanding of the ARNG, its capabilities and limitations in filling the nation's security needs. This paper will address concerns with ARNG training, readiness and employment. It will discuss strategies to maximize the readiness of the ARNG and its effectiveness as a participant in fighting the nation's wars. By addressing the unique features of the ARNG such as its systems environment, capabilities and limitations, this paper explores strategies on how to best prepare and use the ARNG to meet the future security needs of the country. Although the paper will consider homeland defense, the response to natural disaster and support of civil authorities it will focus on fighting the nation's wars.

PREPARING AND USING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FOR FUTURE WARS

The Army National Guard (ARNG) is 33% of the total Army's strength and 42% of the Army's deployable strength.¹ Based on recent ARNG deployments it is clear that the nation cannot meet its security needs without it. Statements from the country's leadership regarding the considerable stress placed on the Army shows that ARNG readiness and effective employment are necessary to meet current and future national security needs. These facts illustrate the strategic significance of a ready and properly employed ARNG. This paper looks at the elements that insure a ready and effective ARNG is always available.

One must understand the capabilities of a tool to employ it effectively. An understanding of how the tool fits in the environment in which it is used is also important. More complicated than a hammer, the ARNG is a tool of national military power. This paper will address concerns with ARNG training, readiness and employment. It will discuss strategies to maximize the readiness of the ARNG and its effectiveness as a participant in fighting the nation's wars. By addressing the unique features of the ARNG such as its systems environment, capabilities and limitations, this paper explores strategies on how to best prepare and use the ARNG to meet the future security needs of the country.

In the forward he wrote for the book I am the Guard, General John W. Vessey (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Army National Guard Private) says, "The Regular Army and the National Guard need each other perhaps more than at any time in history. The nation needs both in a strong, mutually reinforcing posture."² General Vessey, one of the authors of the round out concept of the late 1970s, strongly believed in President George Washington's two mutually supporting pillars of the nation's defense, the Active Army (AA) and the Militia. In light of an imminent military reduction after the Vietnam War, General Vessey believed the long-standing influence that the Army National Guard (ARNG) has with the community would become more and more important as the total Army became smaller.³

In a recent talk LTG Vaughn (Director of the Army National Guard) gave at the United States Army War College, he suggested that the AA leadership must use all their resources better to meet current demands on the total Army. LTG Vaughn was alluding to the Army's haphazard approach to calling up and mobilizing ARNG units and individuals to support deployments post September 11, 2001. LTG Vaughn also felt that with earlier notification Army National Guard Units could complete the individual training and validations required before federalization and movement to a mobilization station. He believed that this would reduce the

time required of Guardsmen and make them available for additional mobilizations later.⁴ The haphazard mobilizations of units and individuals along with late deployment notifications are just two of the concerns that this paper will address as it provides strategies to improve ARNG readiness and employment.

The ARNG requires optimal readiness as an indispensable element in meeting national security needs. In a speech at the U.S. Army War College the Commander of Joint Forces Command General Lance Smith said, "Something has to give. Either we need more active duty forces or increased access to the Guard."⁵ He also stated that the nation needs three or four more ARNG combat brigades in the rotation cycle to meet current demands.⁶ Maximized ARNG readiness is required to meet the nation's needs.

This paper will outline the challenging and beneficial attributes of the ARNG and recommend actions to improve its effectiveness. The paper will address the following issues: future U.S. security concerns; the unique aspects of the ARNG; unique talents and capabilities of the ARNG; operational environment challenges of the ARNG; and mobilization process of the ARNG. Finally, it will discuss the missions best suited for ARNG employment. In concert with an analysis of future strategic security concerns, this paper will give strategies to better prepare and utilize the ARNG.

When considered alone each of the areas listed will not have significant strategic implications, but when combined to affect ARNG readiness their impact is profound. As stated by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, the U.S. Army cannot achieve its military goals without the ARNG.⁷

Future U.S. Security Concerns

Events over the last few decades will shape U.S. security concerns for years to come. They include the fall of the former Soviet Union, the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) and the rise of the Chinese military and economy. The Soviet Union's fall and the GWOT influenced the change of the ARNG from a reinforcing element to a rotational element with the AA, or from a strategic to an operational reserve. In considering the best employment of the ARNG, an understanding of the nation's future security environment is necessary.

The fall of the former Soviet Union left the world with one superpower (the U.S.) and seventeen new countries struggling to find their place in the world community. All of these countries are experiencing varying levels of political unrest. Two of them, Georgia and Tajikistan, have experienced all-out civil wars. Three of these countries including Georgia have had peaceful revolutions resulting in the overthrow of their governments.⁸

The death of the iron-fisted President for Life of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito, and the break up of the former Soviet Union resulted in the tumultuous disbanding of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia produced civil wars and ethnic cleansing. To quell this fighting the U.S. government deployed forces there. The presence of U.S. forces continues today. The United States Army will continue to be engaged in this region of the world to aid the nation in helping these new countries become stable democracies.⁹

The one security concern that will continue to affect the U.S.'s security environment and the Army is the GWOT. In the current National Military Strategy produced by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Richard B. Myers stated that, "First, while protecting the United States we must win the war on terror."¹⁰ We currently have approximately 141,000 soldiers in Iraq and 22,000 in Afghanistan. This large commitment will continue for some time. The U.S. Soldier death toll of over 3,000 in Operation Iraqi Freedom and 300 in Operation Enduring Freedom¹¹ underscores the U.S.'s commitment to prevail in the GWOT.

Growth of the Chinese economy and its military establishment will require the United States' engagement in the Pacific and around the world in order to compete with China's influence and maintain its own. China has pursued unprecedented military growth over the past decade. The 2006 QDR report notes, "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could, over time, offset traditional U.S. military advantages."¹² China reported their defense spending at thirty-five billion dollars last year. Richard Lawless, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, said this figure does not include foreign acquisitions, industrial subsidies, local contributions, and strategic forces. He believes that China's defense spending is closer to 70-150 billion dollars, making China the greatest defense spender in Asia.¹³

China's military acquisitions are very offensive. For example, they have five modern ballistic missile submarine acquisition programs now in progress. These submarines will carry mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles, which with other assets will increase China's nuclear warhead arsenal to several times the current level by 2015.¹⁴ China is improving its capacity for expeditionary warfare with additional air and amphibious lift, improvements in army aviation by purchasing IL-76/CANDID aircraft, and the fielding of new amphibious armor within its ground forces. They are developing an indigenous aircraft carrier, and may be planning to organize a combat air wing for future carrier strike operations.¹⁵ All of this equipment gives China the capability to take war to its enemies offensively.

The offensive disposition of China's military growth combined with their secrecy concerns many of its regional neighbors and should concern the U.S. China's new appetite for fuel and raw materials, along with their past practices of trying to lock up energy supplies around the world and seeking direct markets should also worry the U.S. As noted in the United States' National Security Strategy these questionable actions by China will require increased U.S. attention and engagement for a long time.¹⁶

The need for U.S. military forces to conduct security and humanitarian assistance will increase as populations grow in Third World countries. These countries cannot support disaster relief operations within their own borders. The recent tsunamis in the Pacific and earthquakes in Pakistan are examples of this. The U.S. military will be increasingly called upon to assist in these situations.

COL Richard H. Witherspoon wrote a forward for a paper edited by Earl H. Tilford, Jr. The paper is a compilation of two articles, one by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley about his experience in Somalia and another by David Tucker who serves on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. COL Witherspoon stated, "They (Ambassador Oakley and Mr. Tucker) both agree that the United States, as a great power, will be engaged in (humanitarian) intervention operations of all kinds all over the world."¹⁷ Military security for such operations has also become quite necessary. In testimony to the Open Meeting of the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, United Nations Under Secretary General for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland said,

It is not acceptable that we are denied access to affected populations in the majority of crises where we are deployed. There are over twenty countries where access to civilian populations in need is in some way restricted. Together we must work with governments and - where necessary - with armed groups to systematically address restrictions on access. Vulnerable communities have the right to receive humanitarian assistance, as we have the right and the obligation to provide it... Our emblems have always provided us with a certain protection, based on an understanding and acceptance of our humanitarian mission. This has now been tragically challenged in Iraq and Afghanistan. The past six months have also seen our humanitarian colleagues threatened and targeted in Somalia, DRC, Burundi, the occupied Palestinian territory, Chechnya and various other areas.¹⁸

This statement shows the need to have military forces provide security in areas where humanitarian workers are at risk. All the situations listed above will increase the need for U.S. military involvement in humanitarian operations in the future. Humanitarian aid will be a growing element in the Army's list of duties for the foreseeable future.

There are no reductions in military demands anticipated. With the demonstrated propensity of both democratic and republican administrations to utilize the military in recent decades combined with the current and future set of U.S. security concerns there is no decrease in the military's burden anticipated.

Unique Aspects of the Army National Guard

Over 370 years the Army National Guard has developed many unique attributes a few that create challenges and some that reflect positive qualities affecting its use as a military component of national security. The Army National Guard has developed a very strong culture. The combination of the citizen Soldiers that fill its ranks, their operational environment as defined by the U.S. Constitution, laws and the communities in which it exists have all shaped the ARNG. Finally, the Guard's leadership to include, their State Commander-in-Chiefs (Governors), Congress and their Federal Commander-in-Chief (the President of the United States) also influences this character. As the nation's militia, the ARNG reflects the values and beliefs of the United States.

The formation of the National Guard from early pioneers, farmers, craftsmen and merchants has profoundly shaped the Army National Guard's culture. The founders of the early English Colonial Militias brought two important beliefs from England. First was the tradition of mandatory militia service by all males from 16 to 20 years old. This tradition served the colonies well and grew stronger as they depended on the militia to protect them from Native American Indian attacks in the absence of regular British forces. The next belief was a fear of standing armies and their use by repressive monarchs to subjugate their citizens. This trepidation grew when the British Government forced regular British soldiers into the homes of colonists to quell their rebelliousness.¹⁹ Although these beliefs do not directly affect the disposition of today's ARNG they do influence the motivations and pride that National Guard Soldiers have today.

While possessing many capabilities to meet military requirements the Citizen Soldier experiences challenges that impact ARNG readiness and employment. Necessity requires that traditional Guardsman have a civilian profession. It is a challenge for Guardsmen to balance their ARNG responsibilities with their civilian careers, community responsibilities and family. These struggles vary depending on an individual's situation. For example, a young mid-career parent will struggle to meet the time requirements of National Guard service. All National Guard Soldiers make major sacrifices in their civilian careers and family life for their membership in the ARNG. In such cases, National Guard leaders need to reduce the demands on Soldiers to insure their continued membership.

The National Guard has a dual mission. It first reports to the Governor as its Commander-in-Chief. As a state militia, the ARNG will keep the peace during times of civil unrest and serve the State's citizens in times of natural disaster. An ever-increasing state mission is defense support of civil authorities for homeland defense. The National Guard also serves the nation when called upon by the President to federal service. In these instances, the President of the United States is their Commander-in-Chief.

The National Guard's dual mission has less to do with its Soldiers' capabilities and more to do with their motivation. The tasks performed by Guardsmen for their communities are typically similar to their Army duties or are quite simple, like manning a fire line or filling sand bags. The importance of the ARNG's dual missions is in the motivation that Guardsmen have for serving their communities, states and country. An expression of this was the high morale of the 2,000 Utah Guardsmen and 2,900 Guardsmen from 25 other states who served the State of Utah and the United States by augmenting security at the 2002 Winter Olympics.²⁰

As long standing members of their communities, Guardsmen have significant influence on the will of those communities concerning the military actions of our country. Some military analysts believe this was a consideration when General Abrams developed the Total Force Policy of the 70s and 80s. Other analysts say that General Abrams implemented the policy to protect total Army strength and improve ARNG equipment through post Vietnam War military reductions. The belief is that General Abrams knew that making the Reserve Component (RC) an integral part of the total force assured Congress would require the transfer of newer AA equipment to the RC instead of discarding it.²¹ Either way the results are the same. The Total Force Policy made the AA more dependent on the ARNG. Because of the stronger influence the ARNG has on its communities the public is more likely to react to their call up by the government. This reaction may be positive or negative depending on the popularity of the military action, which in either case is good for the Army. The Vietnam War showed how disastrous it is to become deeply involved in a conflict and lose the support of the American people. Despite the waning support for military actions in Iraq, citizen support for the Soldiers continues partially due to utilization of the RC.

National Guardsmen are little different from the young men and women that join and serve in the AA. They are all patriots. Young men and women seek improvements from the training opportunities and education benefits provided by the AA and ARNG. Discipline and responsibility are benefits they enjoy through membership in these elite teams. Additionally extraordinary experiences, like travel or unique missions attract young people. While not

identical, there are no intrinsic differences between ARNG and AA Soldiers. A small distinction is where and how these young Soldiers choose to serve: in their community or away. Differences between the AA and ARNG are not due to Soldier diversity, but are due to dissimilar organizational character.

Unique Talents and Capabilities of the National Guard

There are many unique talents and capabilities that the ARNG provides the Army. National Guard Soldiers are intelligent. The ARNG has the most high school graduates of any Army component and requires the fewest number of medical or morale waivers. ARNG Soldiers' Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test scores are the best of all three Army components as well. Typically, ARNG Soldiers are older than their counterparts through out all rank levels in the Army.²² Though they may add maturity to the force there is a perception that their age detracts from unit readiness. Nevertheless, ARNG Soldiers continue to add intelligence and maturity to the total force.

Citizen Soldiers possess many diverse civilian acquired skills that often aid in the execution of an ARNG unit's military mission. An example of citizen Soldiers utilizing civilian acquired skills can be seen when fire fighters performed their military duties as members assigned in the fuels and ammunitions platoon of the 1st Battalion (Attack Helicopter) 111th Aviation Regiment. By using their fire fighting skills they streamlined the platoons forward arming and refueling point operations thereby reducing the set up time significantly. There are many examples of this form of serendipity. Skills acquired from military service also transfer and support ARNG Soldiers' civilian employers and communities. These Soldiers develop leadership skills that help local businesses and communities when they are at home.

Ownership by its members is the greatest strength that the National Guard offers the Army. Enduring associations that ARNG Soldiers have with their units defines ownership in the ARNG. These relationships include leaders with subordinates, subordinates with leaders, contemporaries with each other, and Soldiers with their equipment. ARNG leaders treat their subordinates as true team members because of stable and often familial associations. Leaders, contemporaries, and subordinates develop relationships that last indefinitely. Sometimes these relationships become too familiar and are detrimental to good order and discipline; however, teams based on respect, professionalism and long-term mutual goals are the norm.

ARNG leaders realize Soldiers can easily move from unit to unit and even from state to state. A lost Soldier challenges the unit's members who are part of the recruiting, training and retention system. Personnel losses reduce unit readiness until a replacement is recruited and

trained. Strong leadership and the efforts of the entire unit maintain unit strength and readiness. ARNG officers exercise leadership based on respect, inspiration, mentoring and team building. They create Army training that is exciting, fulfilling and meaningful. It meets the readiness needs of the organization and includes all required annual training. Otherwise, Soldiers will leave if training is sub-par. To retain and effectively train Soldiers ARNG leaders must be resourceful, creative and dynamic. The ARNG environment builds strong leaders who lead by noble means.

Traditionally the ARNG takes exceptional care of its equipment, because they train and deploy with it. ARNG Soldiers do not have a permanent change of station (PCS) every three years, making ownership of equipment even more important. The ARNG often receives its equipment from AA units as they modernize. Considerable effort is expended to get this equipment to meet not only prescribed but also specific unit standards thereby motivating National Guard Soldiers to maintain it exceptionally well. Until recently many ARNG units had Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicles (CUCV). Few parts were available for CUCVs, requiring ARNG units to carefully maintain these vehicles and keep them operational. The maintenance environment also drives the ARNG's relationship with its equipment. Long-term connections Guardsmen have with their equipment influences the strong ownership they feel for it.

Most National Guardsmen spend their careers in one State moving between two or three organizations. State organizations do not allow for PCS moves and an associated new start every three years. The associations developed in a State will directly affect the entire career of these Soldiers. ARNG Soldiers quickly learn that professional and productive team membership is required for a successful National Guard career.

Army National Guard Operational Environment Challenges

The current ARNG operational environment possesses many challenges for its units and members. The National Guard's operational environment is vast and assorted. It exists from small town U.S.A. to the streets of Falugia, as well as in company boardrooms and that of tank turrets. The sheer diversity of the ARNG creates challenges that require purposeful thought and expertise to negotiate.

As mentioned earlier, it is a challenge for ARNG Soldiers and units to balance civilian careers, family demands, and military service. Making this arrangement work requires sacrifice in all three areas. ARNG Soldiers and leaders constantly adjust their efforts to balance ARNG demands and other responsibilities. For example, many must ask whether a Soldier's military school is more important than a new leadership opportunity with his civilian employer. Leaders

seek creative alternatives to get a Soldier the necessary training while still allowing the Soldier to take advantage of their civilian opportunities. Creatively balancing organizational and a Soldier's needs is a tremendous challenge in the ARNG.

The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model is a recent change to the ARNG operational environment. ARFORGEN manages units and required resources as they prepare for deployment. Most ARNG units are on a six-year rotation spending two years in each category of Reset/Train Pool, Ready Pool and Available Pool. A unit starts the ARFORGEN cycle in the Reset and Train Pool upon returning from deployment. This renewal period allows units to reset equipment, catch up on individual training and restore personnel strength. Towards the end of the Reset and Train Pool, units begin collective training. On the third year of the model organizations move into the Ready Pool where they conduct collective training up to their level of organization. In the model's fourth year, authorities consider organizations ready for deployment, but they normally do not deploy. In the Ready Pool, units will continue to conduct collective training. As units enter the fifth year of the ARFORGEN cycle, they move into the Available Pool. Here units are validated and become available for deployment. If a unit is deploying they are designated a Deployment Expeditionary Force. If available and not deploying, they are designated Contingency Expeditionary Forces and remain prepared to deploy based on contingencies.²³ ARFORGEN is a useful model that gives predictability to deployments, which is critical to National Guardsmen as they plan their lives.

If properly implemented the ARFORGEN model will enhance ARNG readiness in numerous ways. First, unit members understand the schedule as their unit enters the cycle. Next, the schedule is stable; preventing changes to individual unit member plans and prevents their impact on their families and employers. Units tediously recruit and retain unit members to eliminate "breaking" units to staff other deploying units. Cross leveling to build deployable units defeats the intent of ARFORGEN to build a predictable deployment schedule. ARFORGEN will pay tremendous dividends in preparing ready ARNG units for deployment.

Current and future use of National Guard units as rotational replacements significantly affects ARNG readiness. Individual training requirements for both military occupational specialty (MOS) and professional military education (PME) requirements requires synchronization with mobilization periods. Essential MOSs requires training early to ensure qualified Soldiers are available to conduct collective training prior to mobilization. After a unit's deployment is the most opportune time for ARNG Soldiers to attend PME. Soldiers can

complete this training with minimum disruption to their employers and careers. It also puts the training in the proper readiness timeframe (Reset/Train Pool).

By creating multiple options for Soldiers to take MOS qualification or PME, it increases ARNG readiness. Options may include MOS Mobile Training Teams²⁴, Supervised On the Job Training (SOJT)²⁵, and distributive or distance learning. If Soldiers can attend training at home station on drill weekends, they will increase their commitment to the ARNG. The best policy is to increase the number of training options to meet the needs of ARNG Soldiers.

Current equipment shortages have crippled the ARNG from doing both its State and National mission. A United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) report entitled Army National Guard and Army Reserves Readiness for 21st Century Challenges published September 21, 2006 identifies ARNG equipment concerns. The report suggests the Army under resourced ARNG units because they were projected to deploy in the later phases of major combat operations as a strategic reserve. This is the foundation of current ARNG equipment readiness problems. The Army's policy change to use the ARNG as an operational reserve or rotational force to ease the deployment stress on AA units created problems. Because the Army never procured this equipment, it was cross-leveled from non-deploying to deploying units to fill the shortages. In addition, many units were required to leave equipment in theater upon redeployment, further aggravating shortages. The ARNG reports some units have less than one third of their required equipment. The report suggests that not only does this create risk to the nation's ability to respond to unforeseen difficulties overseas but it also prevents ARNG units from responding to domestic natural disasters and meeting homeland defense requirements. Using ARNG units as an operational reserve requires full resourcing in order to train, deploy and meet State mission requirements.²⁶

The GAO report also states the Army has several initiatives to address these problems. Initiatives include ARFORGEN, Transformation/Modularity and 21 billion dollars of funding over the next five years to replace ARNG equipment. This amount will fix numerous equipment shortages but it will not restore ARNG equipment readiness. The report says that until the Army builds a plan showing what the future deployment and transformation demands for the National Guard are, the readiness of the ARNG is likely to continue to erode.²⁷

The equipment problem is similar to the problems that the ARNG is experiencing with the cross leveling of Soldiers in order to man deploying units. The cross leveling has to stop. ARNG units require full manning, training and equipping so they can deploy without cross leveling from other units.

Filling and validating unit's personnel and equipment requirements will maximize its readiness before it moves into the ARFORGEN Available Pool. In the past AA interest in ARNG readiness has fluctuated. Prior to Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, there was little AA effort to insure ARNG unit preparedness and validation for deployment. When three ARNG combat brigades failed to meet AA combat readiness standards for Operation Desert Storm AA interest in ARNG readiness increased. There are many good aspects in this change. The AA created training relationships with ARNG units focused on providing training guidance and assistance. They created Regional Training Battalions (RTB) and Resident Training Detachments (RTD), which focused on supporting ARNG unit training and readiness. These changes work well. One change that does not work is when RTBs validate ARNG unit combat readiness. In the AA, a unit's higher headquarters conducts its validations. The validation of ARNG units should also occur this way, because no organization will have more interest in their subordinate's readiness than a higher headquarters in a combat zone.

The current combat experience of ARNG organizations will allow them to validate their own subordinate units. This includes individual and collective tasks. Allowing a higher headquarters to validate the readiness of all their units either AA or ARNG will improve unit combat readiness in theater.

Mobilization Process of the Army National Guard

On 11 January 2007, the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Peter Pace discussed changes to Department of Defense (DoD) policy towards Reserve Component (RC) deployments. One change eliminates the 24-month limit of accumulated deployment time for RC soldiers.²⁸ The policy change reflects DoD's continued dependence on the RC to meet current operational demands. Compliance with this change will require the AA to reduce the time needed to mobilize RC units.

Changes in the DoD's RC policy also stipulate the reduction of RC federalization to no more than 12 months per deployment. A reduction in mobilization time requirements is also necessary to realize this goal.

Communicating deployment cycles clearly to ARNG units and allowing them to validate their subordinate organizations will significantly streamline the mobilization process. Most ARNG units have local training and maneuver areas available to conduct collective training. Local training space enables collective training and validation for ARNG units at their home station. By completing individual training and collective validations up to the company level before mobilization units can reduce required mobilization training time to that required for

collective training with and validation by their higher headquarters. This reduces the mobilization of an ARNG Brigade Combat Team from six to two months. When training and maneuver areas are available collective training and validations should occur at home station, and mobilizing a unit away from home should occur only if its higher headquarters cannot train with and validate it at the ARNG unit's home station.

Missions Best Suited for the Army National Guard

The ARNG has shown its capability to meet any requirements asked of it by the Army.

As of April 2006, over 53,500 Guardsmen were serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom (139,733 to date), 14,000 in Operation Enduring Freedom (37,700 to date), and 652 in Operation Noble Eagle. Since 9-11, over 248,000 Soldiers were mobilized under USC Title 10 authority (federal orders) and over 337,000 under Title 10 or Title 32 (federal and state orders).²⁹

The numbers of Soldiers listed above represent all of the 34 combat maneuver brigades in the ARNG. It also represents every branch in the Army and every level of headquarters from company to division. Over the last 5 years, ARNG units have proven that they are capable of successfully operating on today's battlefield.

In testimony before Congress Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Schoomaker stated,

Before I close, I'd like to take a moment to highlight the magnificent performance of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers. They have proven that they are indispensable partners with the active Army in defending our Nation's interests, at home and abroad. Every day, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve prove their worth. Since 911, Army Guard Soldiers have comprised over 186,000 of the more than 650,000 Soldiers who have deployed to combat terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq... In the past five years, over 192,000 Army Guardsmen have been part of the nationwide effort to secure the homeland... These missions could not have been fully executed without them.³⁰

This quote demonstrates the capabilities of the ARNG. It shows that when properly resourced it can meet any Army standard.

The dual (State and Federal) missions of the ARNG makes it particularly suited to humanitarian missions that will become more and more common in the Army's future. As populations continue to grow in coastal areas prone to earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes the need for U.S. military forces to respond to natural disasters abroad will increase. By training for and executing state missions, the ARNG has developed capabilities to support humanitarian operations. Such support includes light infantry assistance with security, medical evacuation assets to rescue survivors from perilous circumstances and engineer units to support rebuilding efforts.

ARNG capabilities are well suited to current military operations involving nation-building, augmenting host nation security and training host nation military establishments. These missions are most appropriate for the ARNG because they are similar to the ARNG's state mission. This mission mirrors reacting to a natural disaster and supporting civil authorities. The maturity and diverse experience inherent to the ARNG adds to their effectiveness in conducting these complex missions. The ARNG is successfully accomplishing the training of the Afghan National Army. Nation-building missions are an excellent fit for the ARNG's capabilities.

An article in an Australian newspaper The Sunday Mail stated, "In a somber televised address, Mr. Bush has admitted there were not enough troops sent to Iraq to secure the country after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime."³¹ President Bush's admission suggests the country needs more forces capable of early entry during military interventions. By using more ARNG soldiers during the invasion of Iraq the insurgency that arose might have been better controlled.

Few recommend using Guardsmen for early entry; however, the ARNG has many attributes that favor this employment. The ARNG has strong, mature and now experienced organizations. If the ARNG has a greater influence on the nation's will, what better way to test the nation's support of a military action than to use ARNG units at its beginning. All Soldiers prefer shorter conflicts. With the increased use of ARNG forces at the beginning of an engagement secure conditions would be established earlier, reducing the conflict's duration. Shorter deployments fit the dual careers of most ARNG Soldiers better. Concerns with this recommendation are the short notice for deployment and AA leaders who have concerns about ARNG unit readiness. However, with proper implementation of ARFORGEN ARNG units and Soldiers can overcome these readiness and deployment concerns.

Conclusion

The ARNG will be best prepared and used to meet the U.S.'s future security needs by understanding the nation's predicted security environment, the peculiarities of the ARNG and its current operational environment. To use the ARNG effectively it is also important to understand its character, its capabilities and limitations. By making changes to the ARNG based on these understandings the ARNG will more effectively meet the U.S.'s security needs.

Our future national security concerns are varied. It will require the efforts of the total force and all its components to master them. The ARNG brings many diverse and supportive capabilities to the nation's security effort. By understanding these capabilities, the ARNG will be managed better to meet the security needs of the country. The ARNG's strengths include a strong heritage, ownership, strong community influence, sturdy consistent teams based on

community relationships and respect. The ARNG is also composed of extremely intelligent and mature Soldiers and strong officers who lead by inspiring. Fully appreciating and understanding these strengths will insure future policies and plans that take advantage of them.

Another key to effectively using the ARNG is to understand its environment and challenges. This includes taking care of the citizen Soldier. The challenges here are creating opportunities for individual MOS and PME training, creating a steady predictable schedule, and developing the proper balance of family, civilian career and military service. There are many challenges to an effective ARNG but none is as important as this one.

The knowledge gained above will facilitate changes that will improve ARNG effectiveness. These changes include, creating a number of different ways to insure that Guardsmen can complete their individual training needs, reducing the time required to mobilize an organization, conducting home station mobilizations when possible, and allow higher headquarters to validate unit readiness. The ARNG has shown itself to be a capable national security asset and with minor changes, it will be even better.

A strong understanding of the ARNG will help determine which national security missions best fit its capabilities. These missions include humanitarian relief, nation building and early entry. These are all missions that the ARNG is fully capable of accomplishing. The ARNG is best suited for humanitarian relief and nation building. It is completely capable of functioning as an early entry force.

On their own the issues presented and the recommendations made by this paper may appear simple, but when considered collectively with the profound effect that they have on ARNG (33% of the total Army strength) readiness these ideas become definitively strategic. The United States cannot meet its military needs or maintain its sovereignty with out an effective militia.

Utilization of the ARNG over the past five years includes every type and level of military operations. The ARNG has proven that it can prepare for and accomplish any missions assigned if properly resourced. To utilize the Army National Guard effectively, Army leaders must understand the ARNG and keep an open mind about its capabilities, limitations and true potential.

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